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Two Notions of Privacy Onlinet
Avner Levin* and Patricia Sdnchez Abril**
ABSTRACT
Users of social networking websites tend to disclose much
personal information online yet seem to retain some form of an
expectation of privacy. Is this expectation of privacy always
unreasonable? How do users of online social networks define their
expectations of privacy online?
These questions were the impetus behind an empirical study,
the findings of which are presented in this Article. The project,
simultaneously conducted in Canada, at Ryerson University, and in
the United States, at the University of Miami, consisted of a survey
regarding personal information protection and expectations of privacy
on online social networks (OSNs). Approximately 2,500 young adults
between the ages of 18 and 24 were surveyed about the personal
information they post online, the measures they take to protect such
information, and their concerns, if any, regarding their personal
information. Respondents also reacted to several hypothetical
scenarios in which their privacy was breached on an OSN by measures
both within and beyond their control.
The theoretical assumption underlying this research project is
that two prevalent and competing notions of privacy online exist: one
rooted in control and the other in dignity. Of the two, the idea of
privacy as control over one's personal information has, to date, been
predominant. Legislation, regulation, corporate policy, and technology
are often analyzed and evaluated in terms of the measure of control
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and in particular to Professors David Post and Daniel Gervais, for their insightful
comments. In addition, the authors would like to thank Alissa del Riego for her valuable
research assistance.
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offered to individuals over their personal information. Leading OSNs,
such as Facebook and MySpace, propagate a notion of privacy as user
control. However, online social networking poses a fundamental
challenge to the theory of privacy as control. A high degree of control
cannot preclude the possibility that online socializers would post
unflattering, defamatory, or personal information about each other,
and that this information would in turn be available to a large, if not
unrestricted, online audience. Many online socializers post personal
information seemingly without much concern over the loss of control,
yet it seems that online socializers react with indignation when their
personal information is accessed, used, or disclosed by individuals
perceived to be outside their social network.
The findings presented here indicate indeed that online
socializers have developed a new and arguably legitimate notion of
privacy online, that if accepted by OSNs, will offer online socializers
both control and protection of their dignity and reputation. We call
this notion network privacy. According to network privacy,
information is considered by online socializers to be private as long as
it is not disclosed outside of the network to which they initially
disclosed it, if it originates with them, or as long as it does not affect
their established online personae, if it originates with others. OSNs, as
businesses profiting from socializing online, are best positioned to offer
online socializers, often the young and vulnerable, effective protection
in accordance with their notion of network privacy above and beyond
regular measures of personal information control, and they should be
required to do so.
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I see no hope for the future of our people if they are dependent on the frivolous
youth of today, for certainly all youth are reckless beyond words.
-Hesiod 800 BC
Hesiod mused three thousand years ago, yet his comments
seem as relevant as ever to the conduct of young online socializers
today. Teenagers and young adults post salacious photos of
themselves and their peers, blog about intimate details, breakup
relationships, forge new ones, and vent about bosses and colleagues
online, among other activities that are traditionally deemed private.
Reckless? No doubt, and yet, there are many popular accounts of the
same online socializers reporting feelings of invasion when unintended
audiences discover online photos or when an online "friend" betrays
trust.1 Herein is the privacy contradiction: users of social networking
websites tend to disclose much personal information online, yet they
seem to retain an expectation of privacy. Is this expectation always
unreasonable? Can the ancient wisdom that the "youth of today"
behave recklessly be reconciled with the reported feeling of
vulnerability online? How do users of online social networks define
their expectations of privacy online? Is the feeling of invasion
grounded in a sense of privacy and self that the law should protect?
These questions were the impetus behind an empirical study,
the findings of which are presented in this Article. The project,
simultaneously conducted in Canada, at Ryerson University, and in
the United States, at the University of Miami, consisted of a survey
regarding personal information protection and expectations of privacy
in online social networks (OSNs).2 Approximately 2,500 young adults
between the ages of 18 and 24, who were both students at the
participating academic institutions and members of OSNs, were
surveyed about the personal information they post online, the
measures they take to protect such information, and their concerns, if
any, regarding the privacy of their personal information. Respondents
1. These feelings of invasion into public online spaces have been well-documented
in the press. See, e.g., Michelle Slatalla, omg my mom joined facebook!!, N.Y. TIMES, June
7, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/07/fashion/07Cyber.html?_r
=1&scp=3&sq=omg&st=cse.
2. The Canadian portion of this project was funded by the Privacy Commissioner
of Canada's Contributions Program. The Canadian figures and their implications have
been reported to the Privacy Commissioner of Canada in a report that was subsequently
made available to the public. For the full report, see A. LEVIN ET AL., THE NEXT DIGITAL
DIVIDE: ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORK PRIVACY (2008), available at http://www.ryerson.ca
/tedrogersschool/privacy/RyersonPrivacyInstituteOSNReport.pdf. This Article presents
the aggregate results of the Canadian and American surveys.
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also reacted to several hypothetical scenarios in which their privacy
was breached on an OSN by measures both within and beyond their
control.
3
One theoretical assumption formulated as a possible response
to the questions above, and underlying this research project, is the
existence of two prevalent and competing formulations of privacy: one
rooted in control and the other in dignity.4 Of the two, the conception
of privacy as control over who has access to one's personal information
has, to date, been predominant and widely accepted in legal theory
and analyses of information protection. 5 Both on and off-line, the
degree of control over information is often the litmus test for privacy
protection mechanisms. 6 Simply put, the greater the measure of
control over personal information that is granted, the greater the
degree of privacy protection. Personal information protection tools
such as legislation, regulation, corporate policy, and technology are
often evaluated in terms of the measure of control offered to
individuals versus the personal information provided to another party,
such as another individual or corporation. 7 Leading OSNs, such as
Facebook and MySpace, propagate a notion of privacy as user control.
Indeed, Facebook's credo on privacy states that "(1) You should have
3. The Canadian portion conducted several interviews with public and private
sector organizations about their use of online social networks as well.
4. Philosophers and legal theorists have long debated the meaning and value of
the concept of privacy. Daniel Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (2002).
Throughout the second half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, leading
thinkers have repeatedly attempted to categorize the multiple aspects, harms, and bases
for privacy. Daniel Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006). In this
Article, we focus on the two most prominent theories, which are dignity and liberty. See,
e.g., Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087 (2001); Daniel Solove,
Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1094 (2002) ("Although the extensive
scholarly and judicial writing on privacy has produced a horde of different conceptions of
privacy, I believe that they can be discussed under six headings: (1) the right to be let
alone; (2) limited access to the self; (3) secrecy; (4) control of personal information; (5)
personhood; and (6) intimacy."); James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy:
Dignity versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151 (2004).
5. W.A. Parent, Privacy, Morality, and the Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN
JOURNALISM 95 (Elliot D. Cohen ed., 1992) ("Indeed, definitions of privacy in terms of
control dominate the literature.").
6. See, e.g., OFFICE OF PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA, YOUR PRIVACY
RIGHTS: CANADA's PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION AND ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
ACT 2 (2004), available at http://privcom.gc.ca/information/02 05 -d -08_- e.pdf ('Your ability
to control your personal information is key to your right to privacy.").
7. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INFORMATION & PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF ONTARIO:
WHEN ONLINE GETS OUT OF LINE - PRIVACY: MAKE AN INFORMED ONLINE CHOICE (2006),
available at http://ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/up-facebook-ipc.pdf.
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control over your personal information, and (2) You should have access
to the information others want to share. '
However, online social networking poses a fundamental
challenge to the theory of privacy as control. To understand why,
consider a rather common case in which an online socializer is prudent
about the information he discloses in his OSN profile. He avails
himself of all of the heightened OSN privacy settings. Such a high
degree of control would not preclude the possibility that another
online socializer would post unflattering, defamatory, or personal
information about him, and that this information would in turn be
available to a large, if not unrestricted, online audience.
Personal information is broadly defined as information that
identifies an individual or information about or relating to a person
that most individuals in a given society at a given time do not want
widely known about themselves. 9 It can be a concrete identifier, such
as a social security number, or a subjective account of a wild night on
the town. Many online socializers post personal information on OSNs
and make it available to a large audience of "friends," seemingly
without much concern over the loss of control. However, anecdotal
evidence suggests that online socializers react with indignation when
their personal information is accessed, used, or disclosed by
individuals perceived to be outside their social network. 10
One goal of this research project was to determine the
dominant notion of privacy among online socializers. Is it based on
human dignity, i.e., the interest individuals have in protecting their
image and persona as it is comprehended by others? Or is it based on
control over access to personal information? The results of this study
should be particularly thought-provoking to theorists of online
privacy. Perhaps their greatest value is in their implications on the
future of cyberlaw and the law of reputation. The development of
privacy protection in the law has been deeply affected by the many
philosophical debates concerning theoretical foundations for privacy
protection. It is clear that OSNs, with their rapid and widespread
dissemination of personal information, and in particular, information
about an individual that originates with a third party, have the
potential to transform the law of reputation, and indeed the concept of
8. See Privacy Policy - Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last visited
Apr. 9, 2009).
9. Parent, supra note 5.
10. See, e.g., Leslie Ferenc, Students Baffled, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 13, 2007,
available at http://www.thestar.com/News/article/181019.
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reputation.1" The question for legal scholars and courts is whether
there can or should be an effective legal recourse for these privacy
breaches.
Part I of this Article discusses the two notions of privacy as
they are rooted in the values of "control" and "dignity," and as they are
reflected in public policy and existing law. Part II introduces online
social networking, distinguishing it from its offline counterparts. Part
III presents the results of the empirical study. Part IV offers a
reformulation of the traditional privacy foundations based on the
stated preferences, behaviors, and concerns of online social
networkers. By understanding the root of the new privacy
formulation, law can address new privacy breaches when appropriate,
as the Article suggests in the concluding Part V.
I. Two WAYS OF THINKING ABOUT PRIVACY
Privacy has always been difficult to define. It seems that
everyone wants it, but there is no consensus as to its meaning or
value. Some philosophers have defined privacy as a function of
accessibility to a person. 12 Prominent philosophers and legal minds
have conceptualized privacy as being let alone. 13 Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis were the most influential adopters of this notion in
their 1890 Harvard Law Review article.1 4 Others have defined privacy
in terms of control over personal matters or information.1 5 Still others
have defined it in terms of values such as personhood, intimacy, social
relationships, and secrecy. 16  While no unanimous or unitary
11. See DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: Gossip, RUMOR, AND
PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET (Yale Univ. Press 2007).
12. See, e.g., ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE
SOCIETY 15 (Rowman & Littlefield 1988) ("[P]ersonal privacy is a condition of
inaccessibility of the person, his or her mental states, or information about the person to
the senses or surveillance devices of others."); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of
Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 425-40 (1980) (defining privacy as a variable gradient in three
dimensions: secrecy, anonymity, and solitude).
13. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 608 (1977); Time v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 412
(1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967); WILLIAM
DOUGLAS, THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE (1958); Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 205-07 (1890).
14. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, 4 HARV. L. REV. 205-07.
15. See, e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (Antheneum 1967) (listing
four "basic states of individual privacy": (1) solitude; (2) intimacy; (3) anonymity; and (4)
reserve, which is "the creation of a psychological barrier against unwanted intrusion," and
discussing the crucial role of individual control and decision making at each level.); see also
Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968) ("Privacy is... the control we have
over information about ourselves.").
16. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 4.
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definition of privacy exists, the concept governs interactions among
members of society and between government and its subjects.
Societies, informed by distinct historical and sociological influences,
norms, and values, often adopt one conception of privacy over others.
Their chosen definition of privacy tends to inform public policy and
law. The two predominant conceptions of privacy as evidenced in
modern Western legislation and legal analysis are privacy as control
and privacy as dignity. 17 For example, American jurisprudence places
great importance on the notion of privacy as control over personal
information and the autonomy to decide with whom to share it. In
contrast, European jurisprudence adopts dignity, or a human being's
fundamental right to a private life, as a substantive legal value.
18
A. Privacy as Control over Personal Information
One of the predominant privacy paradigms is based on control
and autonomy. 19 Legal philosophers have long put forth autonomy as
the core value of privacy. When individuals are allowed to act with
autonomy and are treated as ends in and of themselves, their human
rights, dignity, and liberty are assured. As legal theorist Stanley
Benn philosophized, the individual is both a product and promoter of
this choosing being. 20 His choice to keep certain matters private and
make others public is critical to developing his identity as an
autonomous person who freely chooses his own life projects.
21
Professor Richard Parker described privacy as "control over when and
by whom the various parts of us can be sensed by others."22 Privacy
scholar Alan Westin described it as "the claim of individuals, groups,
or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what
extent information about them is communicated to others."23 It is true
that people often voluntarily barter away their privacy for many
reasons, be they social (making friends), economic (getting a discount),
professional (publicizing oneself), or practical (convenience, time-
17. See Whitman, supra note 4.
18. See Avner Levin & Mary Jo Nicholson, Privacy Law in the United States, the
EU and Canada: The Allure of the Middle Ground, 2 OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 357, 357-95
(2005).
19. See, e.g., WESTIN, supra note 15; Richard Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27
RUTGERS L. REv. 275, 280 (1974).
20. Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in NoMos XII:
PRIVACY 1, 10 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971).
21. See id. at 24.
22. Parker, supra note 19, at 281.
23. See WESTIN, supra note 15, at 7.
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saving). The choice of whether and to what extent to engage in these
privacy transactions is one that most people cherish and value highly.
Modern Western societies place great value in an individual's
freedom to control his or her information, which means freely choosing
who has access to it. Giving individuals control over personal
information avoids the paternalistic dilemma that is often inherent in
privacy regulation. A focus on the individual's control over
information allows him to decide for himself what measure of privacy
to grant certain topics. It can also relieve the burden of determining
responsibility for certain perceived privacy breaches. For example, it
is clear that the online socializer who posts embarrassing pictures of
himself publicly and without heightened privacy settings is a victim of
his own reckless behavior. By publicizing embarrassing information,
he voluntary relinquished control-and a legally recognizable privacy
right-over it.
Both in the U.S. and abroad, control and autonomy have
become the theoretical foundation for many privacy laws and policies.
As discussed below, two examples are the Fair Information Practices
and U.S. privacy tort jurisprudence.
1. Fair Information Practices
Generally, the "privacy-as-control" approach has manifested in
the area of personal information protection as a call for awarding
individuals the greatest control possible over their personal
information. This is reflected in what are commonly referred to as Fair
Information Practices (FIPs).24 The overall purpose of FIPs is to
ensure that an individual will maintain control over his personal
information when it is in the hands of an organization. 25 FIPs provide
an individual with the necessary information about an organization's
information collection practices so that he may make an informed
decision whether or not to divulge his personal information. 26
24. FIPs were first defined in the U.S. in Records, Computers and the Rights of
Citizens: Report of the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data
Systems (1973). There are five American FIPs: Notice/Awareness; Choice/Consent;
Access/Participation; Integrity/Security; and Enforcement/Redress. See FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICE PRINCIPLES (2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm.
25. Accordingly, some would argue that "control" is a notion of how privacy should
be managed, rather than a conceptual basis for privacy. William McGeveran, Comment,
Vanderbilt 2008 Intellectual Property Roundtable. The authors are grateful to William
McGeveran for this point.
26. It should be noted that the US FIPs obligate the federal government but are
only a recommendation to the private sector. See supra note 24. In contrast, in many other
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Similarly, FIPs attempt to ensure that an individual has control not
only over the initial act of supplying the personal information, but also
over later stages of interaction with the website. In this manner, FIPs
provide individuals the option to monitor the use, disclosure, and
retention of their personal information. An individual can also verify
the accuracy of the information collected about him and help monitor
the organization's actions.
27
Personal information protection regimes based on FIPs
distinguish implicitly between personal information that is supplied to
an organization directly by the individual and personal information
about the individual that is collected or supplied by third parties. The
idea of control applies mainly to personal information that is supplied
directly by the individual, and less to personal information provided
about an individual by others.
28
2. The U.S. Tort of Public Disclosure of Private Facts
The American tort of public disclosure of private facts
safeguards the aggrieved whose true, but private, information is
widely disseminated in an unsanctioned manner. 29  The tort is
designed to give redress to the victim whose reputation or dignity has
been injured unjustifiably by the revelation of truthful information.
Its elements require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant
publicized a private fact that was not of legitimate public concern,
where such disclosure was highly offensive to a reasonable person.30
The success of this cause of action hinges on an assessment of the
reasonableness of the victim's expectation of privacy in the space
invaded or information disclosed.31 This determination is highly
dependent on the nature of the space or information invaded, the
jurisdictions, such as the EU Member States, FIPs obligate private sector organizations as
well. See infra note 63.
27. The degree of organizational adherence to the FIPs varies, and with it the
degree of control offered to individuals. See e.g., OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF
CANADA: CANADIAN BUSINESSES AND PRIVACY-RELATED ISSUES (2007) available at
http://privcom.gc.ca/information/survey/2007/ekos-2007_01_e.asp.
28. It is perhaps not always desirable that an individual have control over his
personal information that was provided by others, and privacy interests should probably be
weighed against other interests, such as financial, economic or health-care interests, before
a legislative or regulatory decision on the level of control is reached. For example, an
individual's objection on privacy grounds to information included on their credit history is
not as important as its accuracy. See e.g. GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY FINANCIAL SERVICES
MODERNIZATION ACT Pub. L. No. 106-102, Stat. 113 (1999).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
30. Id. § 652B, 652D.
31. See id. § 652D cmt.c.
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circumstances surrounding the breach, and the prevailing social
norms.3
2
The definition and judicial interpretation of the public
disclosure tort espouse a control-related view of privacy. Many courts
have held that once the plaintiff relinquishes or loses control of the
presumptively private information, the information is no longer
protectable as "private."33 An individual could lose control of his
information either because he voluntarily disclosed it or because the
information was already publicly available, viewable, or generally
known. Indeed, the law does not protect privacy in public places, even
when the information is sensitive in nature.
34
These control-based limitations are rooted in legitimate public
policy considerations. The burden to protect sensitive information is
logically placed on the invaded victim before an invasion occurs. Only
plaintiffs who have maintained control over their information-by
drawing their blinds or not sharing their secrets-can be vindicated.
A control-based limitation also ensures that the tort does not unduly
restrict the free flow of truthful information. A privacy regime that
assumes that control over information is dispositive to its free transfer
is more likely to tip the scales in favor of freedom of speech.
From a practical perspective, control-based limitations are a
palatable solution to the conundrum faced by a judge assessing the
merits of a privacy claim. The assessment as to whether the plaintiff
lost or relinquished control over the information is more easily
ascertainable than if he was ashamed or disrespected.
32. See Patricia Sdnchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 13 (2007).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977); see also Sipple v. Chronicle
Publ'g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 668-69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the fact that the
plaintiff had confided to a group of people that he was a homosexual vitiated the matter's
privacy); Nader v. General Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 770 (N.Y. 1970) ("Information
about the plaintiff which was already known to others could hardly be regarded as private
to the plaintiff."); Wilson v. Harvey, 842 N.E.2d 83, 91 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (concluding
that dissemination of the plaintiffs contact information on a flyer was not an invasion of
privacy because the information circulated was on the university's website and accessible
to anyone).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977) ("No one has the right to
object merely because his name or his appearance is brought before the public, since
neither is in any way a private matter and both are open to public observation."); see also
Castro v. NYT Television, 851 A.2d 88, 97 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004); Sinchez Abril,
supra note 32.
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In sum, the public disclosure tort prohibits certain disclosures
based on the control the claimant exercised over the information in
question, not the indignity suffered or the intimacy breached.
35
For some time, U.S. tort law has wrestled with the elusive line
delineating when information ceases to be private. 36  Some
commentators have advocated for a contextual analysis of the
disclosure to assess whether disclosed information is worthy of privacy
protection. 37 The question now facing privacy scholars is whether a
disclosure online-where networks are even more dynamic, intimacy
is diluted, and technology allows for easier and more widespread
dissemination-precludes privacy.
B. Privacy as Dignity
Some defend the need for privacy as a matter of human
dignity.38 It is this aspect of privacy that is at the heart of Warren
and Brandeis's landmark privacy article. Threatened by "the
intensity and complexity of life" and "recent inventions and business
methods," the pair noted, "solitude and privacy have become more
essential to the individual."39 The law, they advocated, must protect
privacy on the principle of an "inviolate personality."40
Since the time of Warren and Brandeis, much has been written
about a right to privacy based on human dignity. Edward Bloustein's
theory of privacy is grounded on this notion. 4' While conceding it
difficult to elaborate a positive description of privacy, Bloustein
contended that all privacy interests share one value: respect for
individual dignity, integrity, and independence. 42  One's moral
personality, according to Professor Bloustein, defines one's essence as
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) (noting the relation of § 652D
to the First Amendment to the Constitution); see also Arrington v. New York Times Co.,
434 N.E.2d 1319, 1322 (N.Y. 1982); Wilson, 842 N.E.2d at 91.
36. Professor Daniel Solove has observed that U.S. law equates privacy with
complete secrecy and that "a privacy violation occurs when concealed data is revealed to
others. See Solove, infra note 103, at 497 If the information is not previously hidden, then
no privacy interest is implicated by the collection or dissemination of the information." Id.
Many commentators have noted that interpreting privacy as dependent upon complete
secrecy obliterates the concept. Id.
37. See Sinchez Abril, supra note 32.
38. See, e.g., Warren & Brandeis, supra note 14; Whitman, supra note 4.
39. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 14.
40. Id.
41. Edward Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 971 (1964).
42. Id.
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a human being.43 A privacy violation leaves a person open to public
view and scrutiny. This unauthorized nakedness in the face of the
world renders a person and his sense of self vulnerable in a way that
is a fundamental affront to human dignity.44 Noted scholar Charles
Fried conceptualized privacy in terms of social currency. Sharing
private information, he argued, forms the basis for intimate
relationships of friendship, love, and trust.45 Without privacy, an
individual would not be able to nurture his interpersonal relationship
and his own identity.
46
A dignity-focused view of privacy emphasizes the development
of one's personality and inner self.47  In this view, privacy
encompasses the right of an individual to keep certain aspects of his
life unknown to others, and thereby construct different "situational
personalities."48 In so doing, the individual maintains several public
personas, each accessible by different constituencies and in different
contexts. Each demonstrates the attributes the individual considers
appropriate and desirable for each constituency. It is no wonder that
the etymology of the words "person" and "persona" stems from the
Latin persona, meaning, among other things, a theatrical role. 49 An
individual's inability to freely manage disclosure of his multiple
personas has profound social consequences. For example, an
individual may wish to keep his level of religious devotion hidden from
his employer for fear that these may hinder a promotion.
The conception of privacy as dignity has had a great influence
on privacy law and policy. A prominent example is the case of
European legal regime.
1. Dignity in the European Legal Regime
Europeans have long considered the privacy of personal
information to be a fundamental right.50 Historically, the right to
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL
CHOICE (Harvard Univ. Press 1970).
46. Id. at 140.
47. Social scientists have long described this as an intrinsic human need. See, e.g.,
ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (Doubleday 1959).
48. Id.
49. CHARLTON T. LEWIS & CHARLES SHORT, A LATIN DICTIONARY (Revised ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1956) available at http://artfl.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic
/getobject.pl?c.7:2266.lewshort.
50. For an excellent comparison on European and American views of privacy, see
Whitman, supra note 4.
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"dignity" and "honor" was initially reserved for the aristocracy,
perhaps as a way for the nobility to maintain public appearances
despite private indiscretions. 51 Developing primarily in France and
Germany, the legally recognized right to a private life protects the
creation and maintenance of personal identity, intimacy, and
community. 52 Warren and Brandeis observed that "the right to
privacy. . . has already found expression in the law of France,"'5 3 in
contrast to its relatively feeble American counterpart.
54
Today, an individual's privacy in Europe is protected under the
European Convention on Human Rights, which requires the
government to respect individuals' privacy and private family lives. 55
Under Article 8, the European Convention on Human Rights states
that "[t]here shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of his right [to private life] except such as is in accordance
with the law."5 6 The Convention ensures a European citizen the right
to respect for "his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence." 57 The fundamental right to privacy has been
incorporated into the laws of EU member states. As one English court
commented in a privacy case,
[t]he law now affords protection to information in respect of which there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy, even in circumstances where there is no pre-
existing relationship giving rise to an enforceable duty of confidence. That is
because the law is concerned to prevent the violation of a citizen's autonomy,
dignity, and self-esteem.
58
Similarly, the constitutions of several European nations
recognize rights to human dignity,59  to informational self-
determination, to free development of one's personality, 60 and to
51. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 14.
52. Whitman, supra note 4.
53. Id.
54. See discussion infra I.B.2 (discussing limitations of the U.S. privacy torts).
55. European Convention on Human Rights. art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Max Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Limited, [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB) Case
No: HQ08X01303 (July 24, 2008) at [7].
59. See, e.g., GRUNDGESEZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 1 (F.R.G.) (discussing the right
to human dignity); see also DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 323, 324-25 (2d ed., Duke Univ. Press 1997)
(discussing the Census Act Case).
60. GRUNDGESEZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 2.1 (F.R.G.) (providing for the right to
free development of one's personality).
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respect for private life.61  The current draft of the European
Constitution echoes these dignitary values.
62
Dignity is thus the theoretical basis for privacy protection in
Europe. As a result, European laws are very protective of personal
privacy in many areas, from consumer rights, as exemplified by the
EU Directive that establishes data protection for Europeans in all
their commercial transactions worldwide, 63 to discovery in civil
litigation. 64 For example, in the well known "Nikon Case" the Supreme
Court of France decided that the French Labor Code prevented an
employer from presenting an email message sent by an employee as
evidence in support of the employee's termination, on the grounds that
the message was private even though the employee was emailing "the
competition" using the employer's computer.
65
The right to a private life in Europe has expanded to include all
levels of social class and celebrity. 66 Unlike the U.S., most European
jurisdictions recognize that an individual's status as a well-known
public figure does not deprive him of privacy rights.67 A controversial
2008 case from England highlights the prominent role of dignity as a
privacy value in Europe. In 2007, a British tabloid, The News of the
World, published a salacious article about Max Mosley, the president
of the world governing body for motor sports. The article was entitled
"F1 Boss Has Sick Nazi Orgy with 5 Hookers" 68 and was accompanied
by various images and an online video depicting the executive engaged
61. See, e.g., CC decision no. 2004-499 DC, July 29, 2004, Rec. 2. In France, the
respect for private life is recognized as one of the liberties protected under Article 2 of the
Declaration of the Rights of Men and Citizens of 1789, which is considered part of the
French Constitution of 1958 by virtue of the reference to the Declaration in the preamble to
the Constitution. Id.
62. See EU Draft Constitution, § 1-2: The Union's Values, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eufLexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/c_310/c_31020041216en00110040.pdf (last visited
Apr. 9, 2009).
63. European Union Directive 95/46EC on the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and the Free Movement of Such Data.
64. Whitman, supra note 4, at 1156.
65. Arret 4164, Cour de Cassation - Chambre Sociale, 2001, available at
http://www.courdecassation.fr/agenda/arrets/arrets/99-42942arr.htm.
66. See, e.g., Stuart Goldberg, The Contest for a New Law of Privacy: A Battle Won,
a War Lost? Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers Limited, 9 COMM. L. 122 (2004); M.A.
Sanderson, Is Von Hannover v. Germany a Step Backward for the Substantive Analysis of
Speech and Privacy Interests?, 6 EURO. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 631 (2004); Lorna Skinner,
You're a Celebrity, Madam: So do we Have a Right to Share Your Privacy in a Public
Place?, 9 COMM. L. 118 (2004).
67. Huw Beverley-Smith, et. al., PRIVACY, PROPERTY AND PERSONALITY, 224
(Cambridge University Press, 2005).
68. Max Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Limited, [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB) Case
No: HQ08X01303 (July 24, 2008) at [1].
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in allegedly Nazi-themed sado-masochistic and sexual activities with
various prostitutes. 69  The tabloid had equipped one of the
participants with a hidden camera and promised her £25,000 for the
video.70 Mr. Mosley sued the newspaper for invasion of privacy and
won £60,000 in compensatory damages, an unprecedented amount in
a case of public disclosure. The English High Court found that there
was no evidence supporting the published allegations that the sexual
encounter had a Nazi motif. 71 Even though Mr. Mosley was a well-
known public figure, neither his adultery nor his unconventional
sexual activities were legitimately newsworthy in the eyes of the
court. 72 In the opinion, Mr. Justice Eady stressed dignity as the core
function of the cause of action. He cautioned against moral
highhandedness as incompatible with protecting dignity.
It is not for journalists to undermine human rights, or for judges to refuse to
enforce them, merely on grounds of taste or moral disapproval. Everyone is
naturally entitled to espouse moral or religious beliefs to the effect that certain
types of sexual behavior are wrong or demeaning to those participating. That does
not mean that they are entitled to hound those who practice them or to detract
from their right to live life as they choose. 
73
The court also highlighted untoward or unconventional
behavior should not negate the law's protection of dignity.
One should be careful not to dismiss matters going to personal dignity because a
particular sexual activity or inclination itself may seem undignified. After all,
sexual activity is rarely dignified. That is far from saying, however, that intrusions
into a person's sexual tastes and privacy cannot infringe the right to dignity
protected by Article 8.
74
In determining monetary damages to compensate Mr. Mosley,
the High Court weighed the gravity of the indignity and the fact that
"[i]nvasion of privacy can never be repaired and the claimant has to
live with it for the rest of his life." 75 The court justified the award of
damages with meticulous logic, arguing that "the scale of distress and
indignity in this case is difficult to comprehend. It is probably
unprecedented." 76  Such a scale necessitated vindicating monetary
damages "to mark the fact that ... [an] individual has taken away or
undermined the right of another - in this case taken away a person's
69. Id.
70. Id.at [5], [65].
71. Id. at [44]-[65].
72. Id. at [233].
73. Id. at [127].
74. Id. at [215].
75. Id. at [124]-[134].
76. Id. at [216].
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dignity and struck at the core of his personality."77  By solidly
anchoring privacy rights in terms of dignity, European jurisprudence
continues to diverge from the U.S. model of control and autonomy.
II. PERSONAL INFORMATION ON ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS
An online social network can be defined as any website whose
main purpose is to act as a connector among users. Online socializers
create personalized profiles within a "community." These profiles
represent the individual in cyberspace and interact with the profiles of
other users. In some important ways, OSNs are fundamentally
different from offline or traditional social networks.Several relevant
features of OSNs merit discussion.
OSNs have traditionally been a forum for the younger
generation. Marketing research demonstrates that only 10 percent of
online socializers are older than 55 years old, and close to 50 percent
of online socializers are younger than 35. 78 The young age of many
online socializers combined with the permanence and infinite
transferability of misguided online revelations worry some parents
and educators.7 9 Aside from cyber-stalking and cyber-bullying, risks
of online disclosure and socialization include reputational risks and
identity theft, among others.8 0 While these are a common concern to
all Internet users, they may be more of a threat to online socializers
due to their increased and enhanced online presence. News reports
chronicling OSN privacy debacles are nearly as common as public
service announcements cautioning prudence online.81  Parents,
educators, and others anguish over the future of civility and privacy in
a seemingly transparent world.
There are a variety of possible explanations as to why many
online socializers seem to ignore risks related to the disclosure of their
77. Id. at [216].
78. Press Release, More than Half of MySpace Visitors are Now Age 35 or Older, as
the Site's Demographic Composition Continues to Shift (Oct. 5, 2006), available at
http://www.comscore.comlpress/release.asp?press=l 19.
79. See, e.g., ENVIRONICS RESEARCH GROUP, YOUNG CANADIANS IN A WIRED WORLD
(2001), available at http://www.media.awareness.ca/english/resources/specialinitiatives
/survey-resources/students-survey/yciww-students_view_200l.pdf (last visited Apr. 9,
2009).
80. See Wendy Cukier & Avner Levin, Spam and Internet Fraud, in CRIMES OF THE
INTERNET (Frank Schmalleger & Michael Pittaro eds., 2008).
81. See, e.g., Posting of Marshall Kirkpatrick to Read Write Web, (Facebook
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personal information online. Like Hesiod, many simply fault the
foolishness of youth. Online socializers, many argue, may be oblivious
to the reputational risks to which they are exposing themselves. In
other words, they do not have the capacity to foresee the shame they
could bring upon themselves.8 2 The reputational risks may only
become relevant when young OSN participants seek employment or
enter the workforce. The tendency of 15 to 24 year-olds to engage in
high risk behavior in spite of clearly identified risks is well-
established in both the crime and medical literature.8 3 Another
common explanation for young people's apparent disregard for
traditional privacy norms is a lack of knowledge regarding the
technology.8 4 Young online socializers, this argument goes, do not
realize that they cannot take information down, or that it can be
accessed, used, or altered by a third party. This argument, however,
ignores the fact that the majority of online socializers grew up online
and are perhaps more net-savvy than previous generations.
A second distinctive quality of OSNs is the nature of the
interpersonal relationships they foster. The relationships between
members of an offline social network differ from those on networks
based solely online. Often, offline social networks are relatively small
in size in comparison with their online counterparts. 85 In contrast,
online social networks can consist of a vast system of connections,
some of which are so weak that they would be nonexistent offline.
OSNs have loosened traditional notions of intimacy and friendship
and their respective nomenclature8 6 The terminology applied to other
socializers with access to all or part of an individual's online persona
(both MySpace and Facebook refer to all socializers as "friends") is
meaningless. Indeed, the making of "friends" online for the sake of
82. See J. Kimberly et al., Linking Youth Internet and Conventional Problems:
Findings From a Clinical Perspective, 2 J. AGGRESSION, MALTREATMENT & TRAUMA 15, 39-
58 (2007) (providing possible biological reasons).
83. See, e.g., J. Grunbaum et al., Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance - United States,
2004, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., May 21, 2004, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5302al.htm.
84. See CAVOUKIAN, supra note 7.
85. See Strahilevitz, infra note 110, for more on the relationships within networks,
the terminology used with respect to socializers, and the legal implications.
86. See Joel Garreau, Friends Indeed?, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2008, at M01; see also
James Randerson, Warning: You Can't Make Real Friends Online, GUARDIAN (London),
Sept. 11, 2007, Final Edition at 9, available at http://www.guardian.co.ukltechnology
/2007/sep/l 1/facebook.myspace?gusrc=rss&feed=technology.
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mere accumulation of a large number of "friends" as a status symbol is
a growing online social phenomenon in itself.
8 7
Finally, OSNs are usually for-profit businesses. The computer
servers on which the website is hosted, as well as any intellectual
property related to the OSN, are usually the property of the OSN.
88
As profit-motivated businesses, OSNs have the fundamental objectives
of reducing liability and attracting as many members as possible.
Although their members do not pay dues, they have a loose
contractual relationship with the OSN provider in the form of the
OSN's terms of service. OSN providers act as the hub for all of their
members' information and contacts. Their consumers are a relatively
captive audience. The costs involved in transferring to a competing
OSN are high. This would likely involve forfeiting all posted
information, photographs, and possibly contacts. Therefore, OSNs do
not have significant incentives to cater to the needs and requests of
their members.8
9
OSN providers control the rules of the game on an OSN
through technology, privacy policies, and terms of service. Thus, the
OSN is the legislator, judge, police, and sometimes defendant in
privacy-related complaints. It stands to reason, therefore, that most
OSN terms of service and privacy policies are clearly established
according to the theory of privacy as control.90
The personal information protection framework of online
socializers is summarized by an OSN's terms of service (i.e., its
contracts with members). 91 Both MySpace and Facebook prohibit
their members from engaging in a variety of activities, such as use of
their accounts for profit or for posting information that is privacy-
invasive or generally harmful to others. Facebook allows users to post
photos of their "friends," while MySpace allows users to post
information about others with their "consent." The terms "friends,"
87. See Paul Giordano, How To Get A Lot of Friends on MySpace, EZINE ARTICLES,
http://ezinearticles.com/?How-To-Get-A-Lot-Of-Friends-On-MySpace&id=270277 (last
visited Apr. 9, 2009) (instructing socializers on ways to accumulate "friends" and describing
accelerated MySpace "friend adding" software).
88. For a detailed discussion on intellectual property and user-generated content
see the other articles in this special issue of the Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and
Technology Law.
89. Despite the incentives to the contrary, Facebook has responded favourably to
the most vociferous member complaints.
90. See Privacy Policy - MySpace.com, http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm
?fuseaction=misc.privacy (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
91. See, e.g., Terms and Conditions - MySpace.com, http://www.myspace.com/index
.cfm?fuseaction=misc.terms (last visited Apr. 9, 2009); Terms of Use - Facebook.com,
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
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"consent," and "privacy-invasive" are not defined in the contracts. 92
OSNs avoid any responsibility, legal or otherwise, for the actions of
other users. MySpace explicitly states:
You are solely responsible for your interactions with other MySpace.com Members.
MySpace.com reserves the right, but has no obligation, to monitor disputes
between you and other Members.
9 3
Facebook is equally forceful:
You are solely responsible for your interactions with other Facebook users. We
reserve the right, but have no obligation, to monitor disputes between you and
other users.
9 4
These statements are in addition to the usual disclaimers and
limitation of liability terms found in such contracts. Both networks
encourage their members to report breaches of their terms and
conditions, but offer no formalized process for dispute resolution or
other recourse to members. The protection of privacy for both
networks is, therefore, closely associated with control over personal
information rather than the protection of the dignity of online
socializers.
95
Privacy policies are similarly infused with the theme of control.
MySpace's privacy policy has sections devoted to information
collection, use, and disclosure by MySpace. It also contains several
other sections that explain to its members how their staff may control
the information provided to MySpace. The policy makes no reference
to unauthorized disclosures of personal information at the hands of
another online socializer. 96
Facebook has collaborated with the Information and Privacy
Commissioner of Ontario to publish guidelines on privacy in an online
social network.97 The guidelines unequivocally state: "remember that
you are ultimately responsible for determining what information you
share with others. ' 98 The guidelines also ask: "Have you made
informed choices?" 99  The guidelines provide readers with several
examples of how Facebook offers socializers the possibility of making




95. Cf. Part B (discussing OSN confidentiality agreements as evidenced by
PatientsLikeMe.com).
96. See infra I.B.
97. CAVOUKIAN, supra note 7.
98. Id. at 2.
99. Id. at 5. Informed choices are necessary for meaningful consent-one of the
more important FIPs.
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personal information. Indeed, as mentioned above, Facebook's privacy
policy states explicitly that it is based on two principles: "(1) You
should have control over your personal information, (2) You should
have access to the information others want to share."'100 Like
MySpace's policy, Facebook's policy does not address the
circumstances in which one user discloses the information of another.
The OSN's focus on privacy-as-control begs the question: do
OSN members accept this formulation of privacy rooted in control?
III. THE SURVEY AND FINDINGS
The findings reproduced here are part of a larger research
project regarding the basic questions of online conduct and OSN
use. 101 Only the findings relevant to the topic of this Article-the two
notions of privacy online-are discussed below.10 2 The first part of the
survey pertained to the usage of OSNs. Questions included the
frequency of usage, content on respondents' profiles, general
expectations of privacy, knowledge of privacy policies, usage of tools
afforded by the network to restrict access and enhance privacy, etc.
These questions were close-ended, and respondents chose from a list of
various answer choices in multiple choice and Likert scale format. In
addition, the 2,500 respondents were asked to complete two open-
ended questions to indicate their primary concern regarding OSNs, if
any, in relation to their personal and professional lives.
The second part of the survey posed four different scenarios.
These four scenarios depicted issues that could arise from use of the
network and/or privacy breaches within the network. Respondents
were asked whether they had personal experience with the scenario,
whether they had heard of the scenario happening to others, their
thoughts on the potential harm generated by the scenario, who they
thought was responsible for the harm caused by the scenario, as well
as other questions specific to each scenario. The following are the
scenarios posed to the respondents.
Scenario 1: Relationship Breakup
"You have just broken up with your significant other. You are
shocked to see that the day after the breakup, your previous significant
other posted compromising and what you thought were very private
100. See Privacy Policy - Facebook, supra note 8.
101. See infra Appendix A (providing survey methodology).
102. See also LEVIN, supra note 2, at 1.
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pictures of you on the social network. In addition, this person posted
nasty comments that painted a very negative picture of you as a person.
As a result, some people whom you thought were your friends have
dropped you, and you are no longer included in social events."
Scenario 2: Party Time
"It was your birthday, and you went out with friends for a night
on the town. You had a wonderful time, drank way too much, and
really can't remember most of the evening. The next day you see
pictures of your escapades posted on one of your friend's pages and
tagged to you. Your family members see these pictures, are very upset
with you, and say they can no longer trust you.
Scenario 3: False Charges
'Anonymous comments circulate on an online social network
about your having been arrested for shoplifting. This is not true, and
you are shocked to see that these comments have made the rounds to all
your friends. No matter what you say, everyone believes you are a
shoplifter."
Scenario 4: Sick Leave
"You called in sick to work, because you really wanted to go to
your friend's all day graduation party. The next day you see several
pictures of you having a great time at the party. Because the pictures
are dated, you start to worry about whether you might be caught in
your lie about being sick. You contact the developers of the social
network and ask that the pictures be taken down because the tagging
goes so far, it would take you too long to find all the pictures. There
was no response from the network. You are stunned to be called in by
your supervisor a week later to be advised that you were being "written
up" for taking advantage of sick leave and put on notice that if it
happened again you would be terminated."
The findings have been organized into three groups: (1)
General Behavior and Perceptions, (2) Control, and (3) Dignity. Note
at the outset that the questions asked did not refer directly to the
notions of dignity and control, but rather asked respondents indirectly
about their sense of harm and who they held accountable. As such,
the findings presented below lend themselves to a wide range of
interpretations and conceptual privacy frameworks. Hopefully others
[Vol. 11:4:10011022
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will take the opportunity to advance their understanding of privacy
online on the basis of the data below. 10 3
A. General Behavior and Perceptions
1. The Majority of Respondents Selected Facebook as
Their Preferred OSN
Respondents predominantly reported being members of
Facebook and MySpace, with 92 percent of the group representing
Facebook members and 35 percent representing MySpace members.
Of the respondents, 90 percent stated that Facebook was their most
preferred OSN, whereas only 6 percent reported that MySpace was
their preferred OSN. These findings, collected from students
currently enrolled in universities, are consistent with general
observations of Facebook demographics. As other commentators have
affirmed, Facebook users tend to be college students or those
interested in college, while MySpace users include a much wider
audience.104
103. Daniel Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006).
104. Danah Boyd, Viewing American Class Divisions Through Facebook and
MySpace, Apophenia Blog Essay, June 24, 2007, http://www.danah.org/papers
/essays/ClassDivisions.html (observing that Facebook originally launched as a college-only
site and has continued to attract college and graduate students, former college and
graduate students, and high school students interested in college).
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MySpace Facebook LinkedIn Windows Other
LiveSpaces
* Which ofthe networks listed below have you heard about?
* Which networks are you a member of?
* Ofthe networks you belongto, which one is your MOST preferred?
2. Respondents Post a Significant Amount of Truthful Information
about Themselves
Over 50 percent of OSN users surveyed stated that their
profiles contain their real full name, home town, high school,
relationship status, interests, hobbies, favorite music, books, movies,
and a picture of themselves. The most often-posted piece of
information was a portrait photo, with 77 percent of users reporting
that they posted a picture of themselves. This was followed by the
user's hometown (76%) high school (72%) and real full name (68%).
These high frequencies may indicate that the majority of OSN users
surveyed are logging on to genuinely socialize with former classmates
or past acquaintances.
Only 3 percent of those surveyed claimed to use a fake or joke
name as opposed to a real, full, or partial name; 14 percent claimed to
have posted a fake or joke photo to represent themselves. Posting fake
names or pictures could be a privacy-protective mechanism for the
user to participate in the network (and perhaps gain access to others)
without being readily identifiable. It could also signal someone who
has multiple accounts and operates under different personae in
different networks. Aside from these, the three items OSN users
reported posting least were: telephone number (16%), class schedule
(8%), and full address (6%).
105. Questions listed in the Figures are taken verbatim from surveys.
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In addition to posting a considerable amount of information,
online socializers are also truthful in the information they post.
Despite the fact that respondents share a significant amount of
information on their OSN profiles, they are selective in the
information they post. The results indicate that respondents are able
to distinguish between personal information that allows them to
socialize safely with other users of the network (such as hobbies and
favorite books and movies) and information that could be potentially
dangerous in the hands of a stranger (such as an address or telephone
number). Posting truthful information is consistent with an intent to
socialize.
Figure 2: Extent of Information Included on Social Network Profile
10 6
My full real name












Agroup photo that includes me in it
Aportrait photo of myself
Only part ofmy real name
Only a fake/joke name U
Only my nickname
Ajoke/fake photo to represent me
Other
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
2. Respondents Perceive the Information They Share on OSNs as
Intended Only for Members of Their Network
OSN users surveyed experience different levels of concerns
depending on the social group that accesses their information. For
example, 90 percent of users are not concerned when their friends
access their profiles, whereas 24 percent reported being concerned or
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very concerned with the possibility of their parents viewing their
online profiles. Users also expressed concern about an employer
accessing or viewing the information they post online. Nearly 35
percent of users expressed that they would be either concerned or very
concerned if their employer accessed their online profiles. Overall,
online socializers reported being most concerned about strangers
accessing their profiles. Nearly half of all OSN users surveyed (43%)
were concerned or very concerned about stranger access. This data
suggests that OSN users intend the information they share online
primarily for their peers.













My friends Other members My parents My employer People I don't
of my family know
U Not at all concerned M Not concerned 0 Neutral 0 Concerned ES Very concerned
The Party Time scenario involves a situation in which family
members of the OSN user access information that was not intended
for them to see. As can be seen in the following two figures, the
majority of respondents considered this a breach of privacy. Of
respondents, 67 percent stated that they were more upset about
family versus acquaintances seeing their pictures, and 54 percent
believed that it, is wrong for people to access information that is not
intended for them.
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Figure 4: Access by Family versus Acquaintances
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Figure 5: Access by Unintended Audiences
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3. Scenarios Resemble Urban Myths -Very Few Respondents
Suffer Actual Harm, Yet Many Appea Aware of
Unauthorized Disclosures
Of the four scenarios, the one that respondents personally
experienced the most was Party Time, the scenario in which
compromising alcohol-related pictures were leaked to family members.
Still, only 8 percent said that it had happened to them. However, 65
percent of respondents had heard of Party Time occurring and 18
percent said that it happened to someone they krlew personally. This
is not surprising, since this example is often discussed in popular
culture and in the academic press."'- Similar-ly. although only 3
percent of respondents reported being personally involved in a
situation like Relationship Breakup, the scenario in which a
disgruntled ex-significant other posts compromising and private
pictures on the OSN, 59 percent have heard of it happening to
someone else. Again, this is unsurprising since media stories abound
of such events as well. 1 )8 Four percent of respondents reported being
personally involved in a situation like Sick Leave. the scenario in
which an employer caught an employee in a lie % Va an OSN, although
slightly less than half (42%) claimed to have heard of it happening.
False Charges, the scenario in which an OSN u-er is defamed as a
shoplifter, was the least common. It occurred with least frequency,
with only 2 percent of respondents reporting that it had happened to
them. These results raise an interesting question. which is beyond the
scope of this Article, regarding the role of the media in the creation
and perception of harms and risks of online ctivities and online
socializing. The following four pie figures display the perceptions of
respondents in graphic form for each scenario.
107. Lindsay A. Thompson et al., The Intersection of Onniir Social Networking uith
Medical Professionalism, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAI MED. (July 7, 200S): sce alnSo lOUU College
President Quits After Beer Photo, MSNBC ONLINE, Au. 28, 2008. al ilable at
http://www.msnbc.risn.com/id/26445893; Siinchez Abril, siipra iote :32.
108. See Jeffrey Rosen, Your Blog or Mine( N.Y. TIMES. )ec. 19, 2004, aailable at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/19/magazine/19PH ENOM.ht'K.'scp= ! & (=Jessica' , 20Cut
ler&st=cse (discussing Jessica Cutler, a Capitol Hill einployee who wr-ote about her love
affairs with six different men on her online blog)o see also (let Reveige on Your Ex.
http://www.getrevengeonyouirex.com (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
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Figure G: Relationship reakup: flas This Happened?
3%
U Happened to me
M Happened to someone I know
0 Heard of it happening to others
0 Have not heard of it happening
Figie 7: Party Time: Has This Happened?
35%
0 Happened to me
M Happened to someone I know
0 Heard of it happening to others
0 Have not heard of it happening
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Figure 8: False Chtgares: Ha,, This Happened?
2% 4%
O] Happened to me
M Happened to someone I know
O3 Heard ofit happeningto others
M Have not heard of it happening
Figure 9: Sick Leave: Has This Happened?
O Happened to me
* Happened to someone I know
O3 Heard ofit happeningto others
29%
0 Have not heard of it happening
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5. Respondents Do Not Hold OSNs Accountable for OSN-Related
Privacy Breaches
Although the role of the OSN varied among the four scenarios,
an overwhelming 61 to 77 percent (depending on the scenario) of
respondents were willing to exonerate the OSN provider completely
for any harm caused by the privacy breach. This may indicate that
OSNs are effectively propagating the view that they are not liable for
anything that occurs on their sites. It may also indicate that OSN
users understand the sites to be mere forums for information
exchange. Respondents found the OSN developers most responsible
for Relationship Breakup in comparison to the other scenarios, but
even then, only 18 percent found OSN developers blameworthy.
Furthermore, in Sick Leave, where the OSN provider failed to
respond to a request to take down pictures and this inaction led to a
reprimand at work, only 12 percent of respondents felt the provider
should be legally responsible. Instead, respondent OSN users
generally held themselves or the poster primarily responsible,
depending on the scenario.
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Does the users' reluctance to hold OSNs accountable for
privacy breaches, such as those portrayed in the scenarios, indicate
that online socializers accept that the role of OSNs is to only provide
them with effective control mechanisms over personal information
that they post? And do online socializers avail themselves of such
tools? With the next category of findings, this Article seeks to
understand how online socializers perceive the notion of privacy as
control.
B. Control Over Personal Information on, OSNs
1. Respondents Use Personal Information Protection 'Fools Offered
by OSN Providers to Control the Information They Post
The majority of those surveyed are aware of and use the
technological privacy-protecting tools offered by OSNs. Of these, 72
percent restricted their privacy settings and 54 percent blocked
specific people from accessing their profile. Furthermore, a majority
of users (61%) believe they take the appropriate steps to limit access
to their profiles. These findings can be explained by understanding
young online socializers as being technologically savvy, yet somewhat
dismissive of potential risks online (and offline, as discussed above).
2009] 103:1
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It is arguable that the contradictory feelings of invasion that arise
when unintended audiences access online postings are the result of an
over-reliance on an imperfect technology as a privacy protector. The
OSN user who interacts confidently under the impression that the
technology will block access to unintended audiences may feel
betrayed when it does not work as expected.












I have adjusted privacy settings to restrict
some groups of people from accessing my
profile
I use default privacy settings set by
network developers
Figure 15: Views on Access to Profile
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2. OSN Privacy Policies Do Not Inform Respondents'
Online Behavior
While 42 percent of respondents reported reading their OSN's
privacy policy, more than 45 percent reported understanding it.
Hesiod's observation again comes to mind. More conventionally, the 3
percent that purportedly understood the privacy policy without
reading it might be explained one of two ways: either the policy was
explained to them by another user, the site itself, or another third
party (blog, article, class, etc.); or perhaps they assume because they
have read other sites' privacy policies, they have a general
understanding of their preferred OSN's.
Even though less than half of respondents reported reading
and understanding their network's privacy policy, over 70 percent, as
noted above, have modified their privacy settings and/or restricted
access to their profiles. It appears, therefore, that at least 30 percent
of OSN users do not find it necessary to read their network's policy to
take advantage of the privacy tools provided. This data reinforces the
characterization of online socializers as being technologically savvy
since they do not feel that they need to "read the manual" beforehand.













Understand terms of privacy policy Have read privacy policy
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3. Respondents Understand That They Lack Control Over What
Others Post About Them on OSNs
Roughly a third of respondents (34%) were not sure about their
ability to control information posted about them on their OSN and
whether they should be concerned about information that originates
with others (30%/). Most respondents were concerned about such
information (460) and a similar number of respondents (45%) stated
that they felt helpless when it came to protecting their character on
OSNs in the context of a specific scenario. Although more than a third
of respondents (38%) felt that they were able to take the appropriate
steps to control what was posted about them on their OSN, the
remaining respondents (2906) were sure that they were not able to
control such information. Further, as stated above, 61 percent of
respondents believed that they took the right measures to protect
their privacy.
These data suggest that although respondents do the best they
can with the tools afforded to them by their network, they realize that
these tools are insufficient to effectively control everything posted
about them on the network. In addition, the high number of online
socializers who are unsure about the risks of information posted by
others, and unsure about their ability to control it, illustrates the
difficulty of combining control-oriented privacy protection tools and
policies with dignity-based concerns in a coherent manner. The
domination of control-oriented tools leads to the dismissal of dignity
concerns, while the emergence of such concerns reinforces uncertainty
about the efficacy of such tools.
1036 Vol. 11:4:1001
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Figure 17: Control
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Figure 18: Lack of' Control
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Figure 19: Privacy Protection Online] 
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At the same time, it is possible that the 25 percent of online
socializers who indicated a lack of concern over information posted
about them by others are not concerned about their dignity. With the
next group of findings, this Article explores that possibility in more
detail.
C. Dignity and Personal Information on OSNs
1. Respondents Are Concerned About Harm to Their Reputations
Respondents were asked to answer two open-ended questions
regarding any concerns they experienced with respect to their
personal lives while networking online. Respondents were free to
report concerns of any nature, yet most reported concerns over their
personal information, which could be expected given the context of the
survey. Many respondents (3 7 %) were concerned about unauthorized
access-which is understood as access outside of their control-to
their personal information. It appears, therefore, to be a concern
based on the notion of control. Significantly, however, the second
109. This question was asked with respect to the False Charges scenario.
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largest concern reported concerned the effects of access to personal
information about relationships (32%). Of those, 68 percent specified
that their apprehension stemmed out of a fear for their reputation.
This seems to be a concern based on the notion of dignity, as are the
remaining concerns within this relationship category (listed in the
figures below). Therefore, the respondent's responses to the open-
ended questions demonstrate that online socializers wish to both
control their personal information and protect their dignity.
Figure 20: OSN Concerns Related to Personal Life
3%
* Stranger Concerns: No Explicit
36% Access Given
* Relationship Concerns: Access
2 0 Given
0 General Privacy Concerns
10% E [ Wasting Time/Addiction
ES No Concerns/No Response
El Other
32%
The following two figures break down the main concerns above
into sub-categories.
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Fig-re 21: StIrianger- oncierns: No Expli it Access Given
3%2%




ES Physical Safety (Sexual Predators)
Note that all of the concerns in this category reflect the notion
of dignity to some extent. Significantly, concerns in both figures are
triggered when the information is used in unexpected ways or through
unanticipated means, although access to it may have been authorized
by the indivdual to some extem.
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2. Respondents Believe That OSN Privacy Breaches
Cause Real Harm
Respondents were asked whether any real harm (most likely
interpreted as dignitary. economic, or social repercussions offline)
could result from each of the four scenarios listed above. Roughly two-
thirds of the respondents asserted that real harm could arise from
each of these scenarios. The Sick Leave and False Charges Scenarios,
both of which were set in an employment context, were considered the
most harmful, with 71 percent agreeing that real harm could result
from these scenarios. The Party Time Scenario followed closely, with
64 percent of respondents considering it harmful.
Respondents reported that the scenarios caused real harm,
although the information was posted about them by another person.
This indicates that online socializers perceive their privacy as being
dependent on more than their control over the information that they
post. It is not the ability to manage the information that they post
that mattered to the respondents, it is the effect of information posted
by others, information that cannot be controlled by respondents with
existing OSN privacy tools. Privacy online can be harmed therefore,
even when respondents are able to perfectly control the personal
information that they post.
Figure 23: Relationship Breakup: Real Harm
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Figure 24: Party Time: Real Harm
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Figure 25: False Charges: Real Harm
"No real harm can come of this."
100%
90%
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Figure 26: Sick Leav e: Real Harn
"No reat harm can come of this."
100%
90%
U Does not reflect myviews U3 Neutral 0 Reflects my views
3. The Majority of Respondents Highly Value the Ability to Act
Contextually and Expressed Strong Preferences Against
Disclosures Across Contexts
Respondents generally expressed the need to compartmentalize
distinct areas of their lives, particularly their work and social groups.
This human desire has traditionally been associated with human
dignity. Over half of respondents (5 4 .3 %) agreed with the statement,
"Work life is completely separate from personal life, and what you do
in one should not affect the other." A mere 6 percent strongly
disagreed with this statement. Respondents were also adamant that
their employer should not require them to allow the employer to be
part of their online "friends" network. This is an increasingly common
practice that almost two thirds of respondents (6 6 %) considered very
inappropriate.
20091 1043
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Figure 27: Managers








Figure 28: OSNs and Work
"Work life is completely separate
the other."








These observations support a more general conclusion
regarding the notions of privacy of OSN users. Online socializers have
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a notion of privacy based firmly in both control over information and
dignity. The following section expands upon this theory of network
privacy.
TV. A NEW NOTION OF PRIVACY? NETWORK PRIVACY
The data demonstrates that respondent online socializers have
a penchant for disclosure. However, they are aware of the risks
involved in online socialization and cherish the ability to shield their
multiple social personae and communicate with only intended
audiences. Though seemingly incompatible with their behavior, this
contradiction could reflect the young cohort's lack of work and life
experience. This purported contradiction could be also indicative of an
emerging notion of privacy online, one rooted more in dignity than in
control over personal information. This Article refers to this
construction as "network privacy."
Network privacy is a notion of privacy based on the expected
accessibility of personal information to social constituencies. These
expectations are grounded in the need to maintain discreet social
identities, or situational personalities. When online socializers
perceive a threat to privacy, it is really their reputation, dignity,
persona, or online identity that is in peril.
The results of the study depict a group primarily concerned
about privacy as it relates to the presentation of the self. Respondents
acknowledge the probability of damage to their reputation and dignity
on OSNs. Damage to dignity and reputation were repeatedly identified
top concerns. Respondents also demanded the ability to create distinct
personae, i.e., to sustain "firewalls" between social, work, and familial
groups. Finally, the data reveals that online socializers generally
share the perception that information shared on OSNs is intended
only for members of the network.
Lack of control over personal information does not seem to
preclude participation in OSNs. In fact, the inability to control
personal information does not figure prominently among the major
concerns of OSN members. Online socializers are, unsurprisingly,
interested in socialization to the point that they are willing to take on
acknowledged privacy risks. They are highly cognizant that they are
relinquishing control over their information and its destination. Few
believed that they could take appropriate steps to control what is
posted about them and almost half reported feeling helpless about
protecting their character on OSNs.
Online socializers are concerned not only about the extent of
the dissemination of their personal information (how many people
2009] 1045
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know), but also about their information's destination (who knows).
This understanding of privacy is complementary to recent
explanations of privacy in traditional offline contexts, which place an
emphasis on an individual's expectation of the extent of the
dissemination of his private information, rather than on whether the
individual expects his private information to be disseminated at all. 110
Network privacy may be a product of new social media and
traditional social norms. Online socializers seem to be transferring
offline expectations of privacy into their online social experiences.
Offline, individuals belong to many social networks and present
different personae in different contexts. Individuals can share
personal information selectively and discriminately between networks.
In a sense, the information shared within a social network is no longer
private, since it becomes known to members of the social network.
Yet, in another important sense, it remains confined to the network by
implicit understandings of confidentiality and trust. Offline, norms
often dictate that personal information not be disclosed beyond the
network in which it was originally shared.111 These norms are more
difficult to enforce on larger, less intimate online networks. The
degree to which the information remains "private" once disclosed is
dependent upon the size of the network and the intimacy among its
members. Even offline, this is a difficult determination, since the
boundaries of social networks are interconnected and porous.
Moreover, it is nearly impossible to control information once disclosed
online.
V. CONCLUSION
Protecting privacy in an online social network involves more
than control. This is especially true when the information is in digital
form. For several reasons, dignity is a more appropriate theoretical
basis for privacy protection on OSNs than control. Dignity provides
clear, simple rules on which to base privacy protection and behavior
on OSNs. Simply stated, dignity-based privacy protection dictates
that any sensitive information disclosed within a social network
should be kept within the social network regardless of its source. This
is consistent with the network privacy model described in the survey
results.
110. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L.
REV. 919 (2005).
111. The popular slogan "What Happens in Vegas Stays in Vegas" appropriately
illustrates this point.
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Solutions must be implemented to address the dignitary, social,
and economic damages arising from networker-to-networker privacy
breaches. These solutions could be legal or non-legal, technological or
norm-based. The survey results demonstrate privacy values that are
not compatible with the control-focused privacy tools currently
available on OSNs and reflected in law and policy. OSN privacy
policies and terms of service do not adequately protect the dignity of
members nor do they address the common scenario of networker-to-
networker disclosures. The essence of OSNs from a privacy
perspective lies in the social interaction they provide, rather than in
the information they collect as an organization. OSNs should
therefore support network privacy as much as, if not more than, the
traditional measures of control over personal information.
It is clear that OSNs have strong incentives against interfering
with the exchange of information they facilitate. Individuals who
socialize online expect their networks to improve rather than impede
social interaction. However, it is equally clear that OSNs are able to
provide their consumers with a measure of dignity protection their
members cannot provide for themselves.
Unlike traditional facilitators of social networks, OSNs are
well-positioned to protect the dignity of their participants. Both the
technology and demand are in place for these businesses to provide
stronger privacy protection tools and procedures to their members
through technology, norms, and meaningful systems of dispute
resolution and redress. There are also many possible regulatory
measures for breaches of network privacy, ranging from the creation
of new cyber-torts to non-litigious solutions, such as the imposition of
a legal obligation on OSNs to participate in a "notice and takedown"
regime similar to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
Given that there is no technological control over the
dissemination of information online, the law and OSN policies must
refocus on protecting a construction of privacy as dignity-a notion of
network privacy that is already embraced by online socializers.
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APPENDIX A
Methodology
The survey discussed in this article was conducted at Ryerson
University, Canada, and the University of Miami in Coral Gables,
Florida. The methodology for both locations was similar, except where
noted below. The survey instrument was developed through reference
to existing survey instruments u 2 and five focus groups that provided
insight into the ways in which young adults use OSNs, their thoughts
about privacy and security issues, and the language they use to
communicate in the online environment. The resulting 122-item, self-
complete questionnaire contained a series of mainly closed-ended
questions relating to demographics, attitudes, beliefs and behaviors
around online socializing and the perceptions of risk associated with
this activity. In addition, respondents were asked to complete two
open-ended questions to indicate their primary concern with OSNs,
first in relation to their personal life and again in relation to their
professional or work life. The questionnaire is available online.
113
The Sample
A total of 2,763 questionnaires were distributed by hand during
the fall of 2007 to undergraduate students on the campuses of Ryerson
University and the University of Miami. Ryerson University is an
urban Canadian university located in Toronto, Canada, with an
enrolment of 23,000. The University of Miami is a private university
with approximately 15,400 undergraduate and graduate students
located in Coral Gables, Florida.
Of the 2,763 questionnaires received, 294 submissions were
eliminated because they were either incomplete or illegible, resulting
in a total of 2,469 questionnaires that were used for the final analysis.
As illustrated in the figures below, students ranged in age from 17 to
39, with over 94 percent falling into the 18 to 24 year-old category.
The figures confirm the sample represented an almost equal
representation of males and females. Furthermore, the majority of
students (67%) work in paid employment on average for at least a few
hours per week while going to school.
112. For groundbreaking quantitative research, see ALESSANDRO AcQUISTI & RALPH
GROSS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 6TH WORKSHOP ON PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES,
IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: AWARENESS, INFORMATION SHARING AND PRIVACY ON THE
FACEBOOK (2006), available at http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/-acquisti/papers/acquisti-grpss-
facebook-privacy-PET-final.pdf.
113. To view the original survey, visit http://law.vanderbilt.edu/publications/journal-
entertainment-technology-lawarchive/download.aspx?id=3900.
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Figure A3: Respondent Weekly Work Hours
7%~
0 None
W Less than 10
14% 01 10 -14 hours
01 15 -19 hours
S20 -24 hours
0 More than 24
20% 16%
Analysis
The results of the closed-ended questions from the quantitative
survey were analyzed using SPSS Version 16. Basic summary
statistics included frequency distributions and mean values for scale
questions. In addition, cross-tabulations with Pearson chi-square
tests for significance and one-way ANOVA tests were performed to
investigate response differences by gender, age, year of' study and
employment. These variables were chosen for the purposes of
subgroup analysis as our initial focus group research seemed to
indicate attitudinal and behavioral differences between males and
females, as well as possible differences among older students who
were closer to graduation and therefore likely more concerned than
their younger counterparts about their projected online image among
potential employers. In addition, students who were already working
in part-time positions, particularly those with more than entry-level
responsibilities, seemed to show greater awareness of and concern for
their reputation. Despite these anecdotal findings, our analysis shows
no significant differences by age, year of study or employment in the
quantitative study. Although a significant difference did exist on the
basis of gender, it was not considered insightful or sufficiently novel to
warrant further discussion here.
Responses to the two open-ended questions were reviewed and
grouped according to common themes by a team of three research
associates. in consultation with members of the research team. In
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order to protect the confidentiality of students, direct quotes presented
in this article are attributed by field group number rather than by
using personal information.

